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Abstract 
 
This study develops and tests a model of how private equity market investors mitigate risk.  We 
find evidence that changes in securities regulation increase the pool of private equity capital.  We 
also identify a previously overlooked category of private equity investors that are neither angels 
nor venture capitalists and demonstrate that they play a significant role in this market. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Investments in private equity are characterized by a high degree of market risk and a very high degree of 
information asymmetry.  Market risk, as discussed by Fiet (1995) and Wright and Robbie (1998), is comprised of a 
broad class of uncertainties: whether the firm possesses the technological capability to develop viable products, 
future customer demand for the firm‟s products, the rate of customer adoption of the firm‟s products, and the nature 
of actual and potential competition.   
 
When this market risk is combined with information asymmetry, investors have deep concerns about 
committing funds.  Information asymmetry has two dimensions: adverse selection and moral hazard.  In the context 
of raising capital, adverse selection occurs because entrepreneurs have better information about the firm‟s prospects 
than outside investors (Sood (2003)).  An entrepreneur with strong prospects is less likely to seek external capital if 
it dilutes their ownership position.  In equilibrium, poor quality firms will be overrepresented in the private equity 
marketplace.  Moral hazard, as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Sood (2003), involves the chance that 
the entrepreneur will engage in actions that are detrimental to the investors.  Examples include: withholding negative 
information about the firm, investing in negative net present value projects, avoiding risk that would be otherwise 
desirable to an investor with a diversified portfolio, shirking, avoiding effort, or entrenching their position within the 
firm.  Taken together, the adverse selection and the moral hazard problems create agency risk in raising capital. 
 
Access to equity markets is rationed or severely limited as a result of the extreme information asymmetry 
between investors and managers of small, privately held firms.  Investment by wealthy individuals appears to bridge 
the gap between the demand and supply of equity capital in this context, While there is a growing literature on this 
kind of investment in high-risk start-ups (“angel investment”), there is little research on how these investors mitigate 
the risk inherent in these situations.  The high agency costs in this context result from a problem that is more 
complicated than the standard difficulties in observing and monitoring an agent.  The central issue in these higher 
risk transactions is the investor‟s inability to evaluate the agent‟s decisions with respect to the use of capital because 
of the high degree of uncertainty.  As a result, the investor must design an investment strategy that allows for 
ongoing monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Our paper begins with the development of a theoretical model for private equity investment that provides 
explicit recognition of the resolution of informational asymmetry.  This model is then tested using empirical 
observations of private (exempt) market investments gathered from the securities regulator in the Canadian province 
of Alberta.  The Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) has implemented major changes to the regulatory regime for 
exempt investment in recent years, and this has provided a unique opportunity to test our model.  Our study finds 
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that the removal of statutory restrictions on the magnitude of exempt equity investments had a significant impact on 
investor strategies in this market.  As the ASC revised the requirements for exempt filings, not only did larger 
numbers of investors come to the market, but also the nature of investment strategies changed.  This study also 
identifies a previously overlooked category of private equity market investors who are neither angels nor venture 
capitalists.  Our research demonstrates that these investors play a significant role in the private equity market.  
 
A Model of Private Equity Market Investor Behaviour 
 
The private equity marketplace is large and dynamic and is comprised of many different types of investors.  
We may characterize these investors as either formal investors, such as institutional venture capital (VC) or informal 
investors, wealthy individuals who are investing their own capital.  It is widely recognized that formal VC funds 
specialize in investing in situations with high information asymmetry. Venture capital investing has received 
increasing attention in finance and economic research over the past decade.  (For a review of this literature, see 
Wright & Robbie (1998)).  Only recently has attention turned to the role of informal - also called „angel‟ – investors, 
and this role is still less well understood.  One result that is broadly consistent is that these investors tend to be 
involved in earlier stage start-ups.  There is growing interest in the academic literature to understand the role of 
informal investors, particularly as it has presented new opportunities and challenges for capital market regulators. 
 
While the economic theory of agency as in Jensen & Meckling (1976) is well developed, its application in 
the context of start-up ventures deserves greater attention, as Jensen (1993) acknowledges.  In particular, the 
standard principal agent models that derive from early agency work do not adequately describe investments in start-
up firms that do not yet have significant cash flows.  And although there is a growing awareness of this lack, there 
remain significant gaps in the development of the theory.  Hart & Moore (1990) introduce a “control rights” model 
that is flexible enough to begin to include these new requirements, and work by Aghion & Tirole (1994) has adapted 
the model more closely to the needs of innovative firms.  Lerner & Merges (1998) apply the Aghion & Tirole 
framework to an empirical study of control rights in biotechnology alliances.  We think awareness of trading these 
control rights improves an understanding of this market for private equity capital. 
 
Control rights play an important role in financial contracting.  The Aghion & Tirole model considers the 
interaction of 3 parties: a research unit, a customer for the research output, and an investor.  The specific rights 
considered include a) property rights contingent on the nature of the innovation (e.g. innovation output directly 
related to the research units parent), (b) trailer clauses (e.g. follow-on innovation), and (c) shop rights (e.g. exclusive 
distribution, licensing).  While this model can be interpreted quite generally, our interest is merely to point out that 
specific control rights will vary considerably by investment, and that this will affect investment patterns.  Examples 
include: the type of innovation, the stage in the life cycle of the firm and industry, and the investor‟s experience. 
 
Thus, there a growing literature on the refinements needed for broader application of agency problems in 
technology and innovation.  And although this literature is contributing to our understanding of the issues of 
investing in this context, much more work needs to be done.  Current theory treats early stage investors 
homogeneously, and pays limited attention to the fine differences in control rights.  As a result, research on early-
stage investments requires more careful analysis of the sources and applications of capital investment.  The 
empirical work in this paper examines the investor side, but we acknowledge that future work should address 
demand-side issues as well. 
 
Amis & Stevenson (2001) recommend that those interested in investing as “angels” should diversify their 
holdings.  There are two somewhat competing rationales for this recommendation.  The first reason, the standard 
financial rationale for diversification, is the advantage of a diversified over a non-diversified portfolio.  The second 
reason is less well understood: so-called „virgin angel‟ investors who lack expertise must engage in investment in 
order to initiate a learning process that only comes through participation in several transactions.  To the extent that 
learning occurs better in related markets, investors face a conflict between learning, which reduces agency risks, and 
diversification, which reduces market risk.  This means that the attractiveness of the investment opportunity will 
vary by the investor type.  A „virgin angel‟ will be looking to gain experience and has an incentive to invest in a deal 
purely for the experience value.  Such an investment is a learning or growth option on the part of the investor, and 
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may make an otherwise unattractive deal worth considering.  We expect these younger angel investments to be a 
smaller magnitude in order to provide the investor greater experience.   
 
A more experienced „angel,‟ who should have little interest in the learning experience, might make 
investments for market diversification benefits.  An additional consideration in this context is dynamically balanced 
portfolios.  An angel portfolio that has a number of mature investments may require early-stage investments to 
balance the portfolio and make it sustainable.  If the investment portfolio leans heavily towards mature companies, 
the investor will increase early-stage investments to provide cash flows to the portfolio in subsequent years.  We 
look for balancing of investment stages. 
 
The propositions below are stated in the context of a recent change by the Alberta Securities Commission 
in the regulations with respect to exempt offerings.  As described later in the paper, prior to the changes angel 
investors were not allowed to make investments of less than $97,000.  The revisions to the regulations allowed, 
among other things, investor amounts considerably lower than that.  As a result, certain qualified investors are now 
allowed to make smaller investment amounts, and this facilitates the kinds of diversification we have identified.  We 
summarize our discussion of the portfolio benefits as follows: 
 
Proposition 1: Reduction in the statutory floor will increase demand for market diversifying investments. 
Proposition 2: Reduction in the statutory floor will increase demand for stage diversifying investments. 
Proposition 3: Reduction in the statutory floor will increase inexperienced angel investment. 
 
A number of researchers have distinguished between formal and informal private equity investors.  It is our 
observation that angels and venture capitalists participate in fundamentally different markets.  While it is generally 
true that venture capital investment is considered “formal”, it is not clear to what extent angel investment is 
informal, as we describe below. 
 
Fiet (1995) and Wright & Robbie (1998) describe the different approaches of formal and informal investors 
to managing agency and market risk.  Formal investors stringently screen for market risk.  After the investment, 
formal investors give a great deal of attention to agency risk, in the form of governance and monitoring.  In 
gathering information on a prospective opportunity, they rely on more traditional „informant‟ networks, such as 
banking relationships.  The emphasis on monitoring shows itself in the following ways: high target goals coupled 
with strong incentives for meeting performance goals, greater use of traditional feedback mechanisms, and deeper 
involvement in board level decisions.  Formal investors characteristically seek entrepreneurs with strong technology 
skills but weaker managerial and market expertise.  We characterize this as a “buy and grow” strategy. 
 
In contrast, informal investors more stringently screen agency, rather than market, risk.  They gather 
information in a more ad hoc way through informal, trust networks, and tend to rely more on a relationship with the 
principals than on external controls.  As a result, they are more willing to invest in firms with lower technological 
sophistication but where the principals possess higher managerial skills.  We characterize this as a “buy and watch” 
strategy.  There is a third strategy that we might characterize as “buy and hope.”  We identify in our data set an 
important segment of the „informal‟ investors that are classified as neither angels nor venture capitalists.   This 
group is identified under the exempt filings of “family, friends, and business associates” or “offering memorandum.”  
This group is clearly neither formal (which would file as corporations) nor angels (which would file as accredited 
investors).  This group of informal investors has received little attention in the private equity literature and yet they 
comprise almost 35% the dollar amount of all private equity financing in the sample. 
 
Arguably, the difference between these strategies has to do with the expertise that the investor brings to the 
table.  Analogous to the finance literature on „dividend clientele,‟ we argue that there must be a precise match 
between the investor and investment characteristics.  On the investor side, heterogeneity in investor skills, 
experience and portfolio wealth level will all play a role in the investment decision.  On the investment side, firms 
have heterogeneous demand for investor involvement.  Firms realize benefits from investor involvement beyond the 
contribution of capital.  Managers may expect better management advice, improved access to information, and better 
alliance opportunities as a result of the venture capital network.  In addition, in the case where the matching between 
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investor and firm results in significant information asymmetry, a staged investment strategy allows the investor to 
monitor and evaluate the firm‟s performance and thus mitigate the transaction risk. 
 
Heterogeneity of both investor funds and firm‟s investment projects requires appropriate pairing for private 
equity investment markets to clear.  We believe that this matching process will show itself most strongly in the 
market for control rights.  Venture capital funds are typically focused on a particular technology or market segment, 
so that investors in the fund do not seek diversification, and fund managers are rewarded based on relative 
performance in the segment.  Angel investors, by contrast, have limited non-financial resources for investment 
projects.  This constrains their ability to monitor and manage to technologies where they possess little personal 
experience.   Yet, their investment is still more efficient than venture capital investment, and there must be some 
comparative advantage for that.  Aghion & Tirole develop the “theory of the existence of multiple principals” which 
results in a role for an outside investor in the management of innovation.  That is, regardless of the particular 
expertise in matching investors and firms, there is an advantage to outside investment in bargaining for control 
rights.  The investor role varies by stage of investment and the nature of the innovation, but we argue that angel 
investors will play a more significant role early in the development stage.  In addition, angel investors‟ resources are 
more likely to derive from technologies that have become established.  Combined with our earlier observations 
about angel investors, we propose the following: 
 
Proposition 4: Informal investment is more likely in established informal networks. 
Proposition 5: Informal investment will make greater use of staged investments. 
 
Statutory Regime In Alberta and Recent Changes 
 
The development of an effective statutory system within a jurisdiction involves a delicate balancing act.  
The securities regulator wants to provide the capability for developing firms to access equity financing, but must be 
careful to ensure that unsophisticated investors are provided with some minimum level of protection.  When a firm 
is raising capital the securities law requires the regulator to approve the firm‟s prospectus, and that the firm provide 
ongoing disclosure of financial and other material information to investors. 
 
The ongoing costs and obligations that are incurred when raising funds through a prospectus offering may 
be prohibitive for many companies trying to raise limited amounts of capital.  Thus, the securities regulators allow a 
series of exemptions from securities legislation, such as the requirement to file a prospectus.  Since the reporting and 
governance obligations of being a public company have increased in recent years, more and more firms are choosing 
to raise capital in the private equity market using exemptions to securities legislation. 
 
As previously discussed, the private equity market poses significant risks for investors.  The firms raising 
private capital typically have a limited operating history, have an ongoing need to raise additional equity financing, 
and may face significant market uncertainty.  As well, the new firm may have management with limited experience, 
and may have a less developed governance structure, so that agency risk is higher in this marketplace. 
 
The exempt equity financing market in Alberta is governed by a series of regulations that allows for the 
participation by various types of investors.  After extensive consultation with market participants, the ASC 
introduced a set of new exemptions that took effect on March 30, 2002.  The new regulations were entitled 
Multilateral Instrument 45-103 Capital Raising Exemptions (MI 45-103).  These exemptions were called a 
multilateral instrument as they were adopted in other Canadian provinces in 2002.  The old exemptions, and the new 
MI 45-103 exemptions, are outlined in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Private Equity Exemptions Historically Available in Alberta 
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Historically, the most commonly used exemptions were for family members, friends, or business associates 
(FFBA) of an entrepreneur (Exemptions 107(1)(z) or 131(1)(bb)), non-angel informal investors who would have 
been provided with an Offering Memorandum (OM) by the firm raising the capital (Exemptions 107(1)(p), 
131(1)(q), 107(1)(q) or 131(1)(r)), and angel investors and institutional (VC) investors who would need to use the 
same “Sophisticated Investor” exemption (Exemptions 107(1)(d), 131(1)(d), or 122.2(1)).  There are multiple 
exemptions listed for each category of investor as the exemption numbers have been changed over time.  In order to 
qualify as a “Sophisticated Investor” the investor, either an individual or an institution, must be willing to invest a 
minimum of $97,000 in the firm.  This set of regulations thus created a floor investment amount of $97,000 for 
angel investors. 
 
The new MI 45-103 exemptions were developed by the ASC following extensive consultations with 
different stakeholders.  One major concern of the ASC was that the $97,000 exemption did not adequately address 
the needs of either the firms raising capital, or the investors with the capital.  The concern was that the $97,000 limit 
would require investors to put more capital into a firm than wanted to, or would deter investors from investing any 
amount in a given firm if they were unwilling to invest at least $97,000.  Under the MI 45-103 exemptions, a new 
category of investor was defined, the Accredited Investor (AI).  Accredited investors were defined to be wealthy 
individuals who were believed to be able to make informed investment decisions and who would be able to absorb 
an investment loss.  The minimum income and asset tests associated with being defined as an AI are similar to the 
usual profile of an angel investor.  Under the new regulations, AIs (accredited investors) were allowed to invest any 
amount they desired in a private equity transaction. 
 
The MI 45-103 exemptions were designed to replace a number of earlier exemptions, but the ASC allowed 
security issuers a transition period, extending from March 30, 2002 until June 16, 2003, to adopt the new 
exemptions.  During this transition period, security issuers were able to use the applicable exemptions available 
under the Alberta Securities Act, the General Rules, or the new MI 45-103 exemptions.  Table 2 illustrates the 
changes in security exemptions. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January 2005                                  Volume 4, Number 1 
 28 
 
 
Table 2: Timeline Illustrating the Evolution of Private Equity Exemptions in Alberta. 
 
 
The Data 
 
Although the use of an equity market exemption does not require the filing of a prospectus prior to an 
equity offering, the ASC requires that firms that use the exemptions file a report within ten days of the financing.  
The exempt market reports are made using either a Form 20, used under the old regulations, or using a Form 45-
103F4, required under the MI 45-103 regulation.  This study examined all Form 20‟s and Form 45-103F4‟s that 
were filed with the ASC by firms raising private equity capital in Alberta between April 1
st
, 2003 and July 31
st
, 
2003.  This time period was chosen to allow a comparison with an earlier ASC study that gathered exempt equity 
filing information over the period April 1
st
, 2002 and July 31
st
, 2002.  Each exemption form contained a great deal of 
information about the financing including detailed information about the issuing firm, the total amount of capital 
raised, and the amount raised in Alberta.  Furthermore, for each Alberta resident who purchased equity, the form 
provides the name of the purchaser, the amount of capital they invested, and what exemption the purchaser was 
using.  This data thus provides a unique opportunity to identify the behaviour of different types of investors in the 
private equity marketplace. 
 
Analysis & Results 
 
A total of 547 equity exemption filings were examined, which represented a total of $677.5 million in total 
capital raised (see Table 3).  Of the 547 equity exemptions filed, 326 were filed by firms based in Alberta and 221 
were filed by firms from outside of Alberta (only 8 were from outside Canada).  By way of comparison, firms listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange Venture Market (TSXV), the public market in which developing firm raise equity 
capital in Canada, raised only $70 million in primary and secondary offerings over the same time period.  This 
demonstrates the very large size of the private equity market in Canada.  The average amount of capital raised in 
each filing was over $1.0 million, although the median amount was much smaller at a few hundred thousand dollars. 
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Table 3: Summary of Capital Raised in the Private Equity Marketplace: April-July 2003 
 Total Alberta Issuers Non-Alberta Issuers 
Number of Filings 547 326 221 
Total Capital Raised $677,512,998 $425,798,749 $251,714,248 
Average Capital Raised $1,238,598 $1,306,131 $1,138,978 
Median Capital Raised $200,000 $219,050 $170,901 
 
 
The values in Table 3 represent the amount of capital raised by companies that raised at least some of their 
capital in Alberta.  The actual amount raised solely in Alberta by these firms over this time period was 
$235,169,293.  It is this amount raised only in Alberta that will be used to provide insights into the nature of the 
private equity marketplace.  The reason that the analysis will be restricted to Alberta-only financing is that the ASC 
requires complete disclosure of investor information only for funds raised from Alberta residents. 
 
Figure 1 presents a histogram of the proceeds raised solely in Alberta by size of offering for all 547 filings.  
The histogram contains a count of the filings for a specified proceed range (the bar graph) as well as a cumulative 
line indicating how much of the total proceeds were raised at that amount.  For example, consider the range $0 to 
$50,000.  Based on the bar graph there were 165 filings that reported Alberta-only proceeds in this range.  Using the 
cumulative plot (the line graph) 30% of the filings reported raising $50,000 or less.  For the cumulative percentage 
plot the scale on the right is used.   For the next category, $50,000 to $100,000, there were 74 filings with this size, 
and the cumulative line indicates that approximately 44% of all filings were for under $100,000.  Thus, 14% of the 
filings must have been for an amount of between $50,000 and $100,000.  An additional 74 filing (14%) were for an 
amount between $100,000 and $150,000, and thus the median size occurred in this range.  The actual median 
amount raised in Alberta with these exempt offerings was $121,200. 
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram of Proceeds Raised in Alberta per Exemption Filing 
 
 
 
 
The Figure 1 data suggests that the exempt marketplace is being used by firms to raise very modest 
amounts of equity capital.  Over 60% of the financings raised less than $150,000 in Alberta, and over 80% raised 
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less than $500,000.  Although each individual transaction was small, in aggregate they represented a large amount of 
equity capital.  As discussed above, the total amount raised in the Alberta, $235 million, is many orders of 
magnitude larger than the entire amount, $70 million, raised by all companies in the Canadian public venture 
marketplace.  Thus, the private equity market is worthy of further in-depth study. 
 
The study of this marketplace was facilitated by the detailed data that was collected from the exempt filings 
submitted to the ASC.  For each filing, each Alberta purchaser was required to be listed by name, and information 
about the amount they invested and what exemption they used to make the investment was recorded.  As shown in 
Table 4, the 547 filings involved a total of 5,713 purchasers (an average of 10.4 Alberta purchasers per filing). 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of Purchaser Details in Alberta’s Private Equity Marketplace: April-July 2003 
 Total Alberta Issuers Non-Alberta Issuers 
Number of Purchasers 5,713 3,676 2,037 
Average Alberta Purchasers per Filing 10.4 11.3 9.2 
Total Capital Raised in Alberta $235,169,293 $168,517,547 $66,651,746 
Average Investment Amount in Alberta $41,164 $45,843 $32,721 
Median Investment Amount in Alberta $10,350 $14,850 $7,500 
 
 
The results in Table 4 indicate that there were more Albertan investors per filing if the firm was an Alberta 
issuer.  As well, the average and median capital invested per purchaser was higher for Alberta‟s issuers than for non-
Alberta issuers.  This provides evidence that Albertans prefer to invest close to home which provides evidence in 
support of Proposition 4, that informal investors will invest more in established informal networks. 
 
The large difference between the mean and median amounts in Table 4 suggests that the amount of 
investment per purchaser is highly skewed.  To gain insights into the distribution of investments made by purchasers 
a histogram of the investment amount per purchaser is presented in Figure 2.  This histogram illustrates that of the 
5,713 purchases made between April and July 2003, almost 1,800 (over 30%) were for an amount of less than 
$5,000.  It also indicates that almost half of the investments were for under $10,000 (Table 4 indicates that the 
median investment was $10,350), and 90% of the investments were for an amount of under $75,000.  These results 
suggest that the private equity market is predominantly used by individual investors with limited capital.  This issue 
will be explored later in the study. 
 
While the main models of the private equity marketplace treat investors as a homogeneous group, securities 
legislation allows for a number of different market participants who are required to use different exemptions to be 
able to invest.  To determine whether there is homogeneity in the investor group, or whether there are in fact distinct 
investors groups active in the private equity market, this study determined the amount of capital raised by type of 
possible exemption, see Table 5 (the investment amount in Table 5 for the period April 1 to July 31, 2003 is slightly 
lower than the amount in Table 4 as a few minor exemptions were not included in Table 5).  The data in this table is 
based on purchases by Albertans of Alberta-based companies only to provide a comparison of the results from the 
year 2002 which was contained in an earlier report by the Alberta Securities Commission, ASC (2002). 
 
The Table 5 results indicate that there are three main types of exemptions used in the private equity 
(exempt) market.  Institutional investors and angel investors would invest using either the Sophisticated Investor or 
the Accredited Investor exemptions (the group will be subdivided into institutional and angel investors in a 
subsequent table).  These exemptions accounted for 66.28% of the capital raised in 2002 and 59.64% of the capital 
raised in 2003.  The Friends, Family and Business Associates (FFBA) exemption would be used by individual 
investors (or corporations owned by individual investors) who had an existing personal, or business, relationship 
with the managers of the firm raising the capital.  This exemption was updated with the new MI 45-103 exemption 
and we can see that this exemption was used to raise 22.84% of the capital in 2002 and 27.09% of the capital in 
Figure 2: Histogram of the Investment Amount per Purchaser in Alberta 
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Table 5: Proceeds Raised by Alberta Based Issuers from Alberta Subscribers for the Two Study 
Periods by Statutory Exemption (Grouped Where Appropriate) 
 
 
 
2003.  Clearly this group of investors is a very large segment of the private equity markets and has not been clearly 
identified historically.  The final major category of exemption is for an Offering Memorandum (OM) which is a 
short document providing limited information about a firm.  This exemption would be used by the general investing 
public who did not have a prior relationship with the management team of a firm, to make an investment in that 
firm.  The Table 5 results show that the OM exemption was used to raise 4.24% of the capital in 2002 and 8.29% of 
the capital in 2003. 
 
The fact that individual investors who have an existing personal or business relationship with the 
management of a firm invest significantly more than individual investors who do not have an existing relationship 
with the management team provides additional support for Proposition 4.  This Proposition will be further examined 
later in the study. 
 Proceeds ($) Percentage (%)
Statutory Exemption
April 1 to July 31, 
2002
April 1 to July 31, 
2003
April 1 to July 31, 
2002
April 1 to July 31, 
2003
Exempt Purchaser $0 $2,000 0.00% 0.00%
Asset Acquisition over $100,000 $4,976,111 $272,500 6.06% 0.16%
Consideration for Oil/Gas Assets $0 $20,000 0.00% 0.01%
Sophisticated Investor ($97,000) $21,819,230 $25,059,138 26.56% 15.03%
Friends, Family, Bus. Assoc. (Old) $8,887,006 $2,230,914 10.82% 1.34%
Offering Memorandum - 1st (Old) $0 $635,000 0.00% 0.38%
Offering Memorandum - Sub. (Old) $932,552 $120,000 1.14% 0.07%
Friends, Family, Bus. Assoc. (New) $9,871,392 $42,931,161 12.02% 25.75%
Offering Memorandum (New) $2,545,135 $13,064,355 3.10% 7.84%
Accredited Investor (New) $32,628,190 $74,379,270 39.72% 44.61%
CDNX Short Form Offering Document $388,500 $5,157,715 0.47% 3.09%
Employee, Consultant, Director $100,000 $2,842,105 0.12% 1.70%
Total $82,148,117 $166,714,158 100.00% 100.00%
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The Table 5 data indicates that the amount of capital raised in Alberta‟s private equity market doubled over 
the period from 2002 until 2003.  A review of data from the Toronto Stock Exchange Venture Exchange‟s Equity 
Financings Summaries, showed that the percentage amount of capital raised in primary and secondary offerings in 
the public venture marketplace actually decreased from $83 million in the April to July 2002 time period to $70 
million in the April to June 2003 time period.  This provides some support for the idea that the changes in private 
equity exemptions in Alberta served to increase the amount of private equity capital being raised in the province. 
 
The Table 5 results also indicate a significant shift in the type of exemptions used by the institutional 
investors and angel investors from 2002 to 2003.  Over that time period, the capital raised using the Sophisticated 
Investor exemption declined while the percentage of capital raised using the Accredited Investor exemption 
increased.  The results support the idea that these investors came to realize the advantages of using the Accredited 
Investor exemption (it was first brought into effect at the start of the 2002 time period) and used it more heavily as 
time passed.  As well, the regulations have resulted in more wealthy Alberta investors choosing to invest as an 
Accredited Investor as opposed to as a Sophisticated Investor.  A more complete review of how this new AI 
exemption was used will provide additional insights into how the change in regulations affected investor behaviour 
in the exempt equity market. 
 
To test Propositions 1 through 3, a great deal of information about the manner in which exemptions were 
used by investors was gathered.  Based on the information in the exemption filing, it was possible to classify 
investors into one of five categories: corporate investor, mutual fund company investor, individual investor, 
partnership investor, or trust company investor.  Table 6 presents the number of investors who used each exemption 
according to the type of investor.  The results indicate that approximately 88% of the purchasers of exempt Alberta 
equity financings were individuals, with corporate purchasers accounting for most of the remaining purchases (the 
number of purchasers in Table 6 and subsequent table is less than 5,713 as infrequently used exemptions were 
excluded). 
 
 
Table 6: Number of Purchases Based on Type of Purchaser and Exemption Used 
Number of Purchasers
Statutory Exemption
Corporate 
Investor
Fund 
Company 
Investor
Individual 
Investor
Partnership 
Investment
Trust 
Company Total
Exempt Purchaser 1 1
Asset Acquisition over $100,000 4 4
Consideration for Oil/Gas Assets 2 5 7
Sophisticated Investor ($97,000) 57 4 81 8 1 151
Family, Friends, Bus. Assoc. (Old) 7 132 1 140
Offering Memorandum - 1st (Old) 1 8 9
Offering Memorandum - Sub. (Old) 1 9 10
Family, Friends, Bus. Assoc. (New) 97 5 1,047 1,149
Offering Memorandum - (New) 108 1,037 1,145
Accredited Investor (New) 290 19 1,845 7 12 2,173
CDNX Short Form Offering Document 65 2 742 809
Employee, Consultant, Director 5 56 1 62
Total 637 30 4,963 15 15 5,660  
 
 
Table 6 also indicates that the new MI 45-103 exemptions became the most heavily used exemptions by 
market participants.  Of the 5,660 total purchases made in Table 6, 4,467 (78.9%) were made using the new 
exemptions.  This indicates that investors quickly moved to adopt the new regulations.  To consider the effect that 
the new regulations had on angel investors, we focus our examination on the individual investor column.  Looking at 
the regulations that were designed to allow angel investors to participate in equity financings, the old Sophisticated 
Investor (SI) exemption and the new Accredited Investor (AI) exemption, we note that the AI exemption was used 
1,845 times while the SI exemption was used only 81.  This supports the idea that angel investors preferred the 
greater flexibility provided under the AI exemption.  It is likely that these new users of the AI exemption were less 
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experienced angel investors who were not comfortable investing a minimum of $97,000 in a given company.  This 
provides some support for Proposition 3 (a more direct test of this proposition will also be developed). 
 
Table 7 presents the total proceeds raised in Alberta from the different investor types separated according 
to the exemption claimed.  The results indicate that while individuals accounted for 88% of all investors by number, 
they accounted for only 60% of the capital provided, while corporate purchasers accounted for 34% of the proceeds. 
 
 
Table 7: Total Proceeds Raised According to Type of Purchaser and Exemption Used 
Total Proceeds Raised from Purchasers
Statutory Exemption
Corporate 
Investor
Fund 
Company 
Investor
Individual 
Investor
Partnership 
Investment
Trust 
Company Total
Exempt Purchaser 2,000 2,000
Asset Acquisition over $100,000 437,600 437,600
Consideration for Oil/Gas Assets 101,000 64,051 165,051
Sophisticated Investor ($97,000) 15,692,039 1,621,396 13,792,936 2,453,550 200,000 33,759,921
Family, Friends, Bus. Assoc. (Old) 199,892 2,113,652 50,000 2,363,544
Offering Memorandum - 1st (Old) 25,000 610,000 635,000
Offering Memorandum - Sub. (Old) 2,000 118,000 120,000
Family, Friends, Bus. Assoc. (New) 18,505,125 254,500 28,565,259 47,324,885
Offering Memorandum - (New) 4,730,381 14,223,741 18,954,121
Accredited Investor (New) 37,254,279 5,088,372 74,867,452 2,037,780 650,003 119,897,886
CDNX Short Form Offering Document 2,459,456 38,400 4,187,250 6,685,106
Employee, Consultant, Director 127,500 2,769,606 20,000 2,917,105
Total 79,534,271 7,002,668 141,313,946 4,491,330 920,003 233,262,218  
 
 
Table 8 presents the average proceeds raised in Alberta from each different investor type classified 
according to exemption claimed.  The Table 8 results show that, for each exemption type, the average purchase 
amount was usually significantly smaller for individual investors than for other types of investors.  Focusing solely 
on the individual investors, we note that for the angel investor exemptions the average investment size was $170,283 
when the old SI exemption was used and only $40,579 when the new AI exemption was used.  This supports the 
idea that the change in exempt regulations has allowed new angel investors to enter the exempt equity market and 
make investments of a dollar amount they are more comfortable with.  This is consistent with Proposition 3, that a 
reduction in the statutory floor will increase inexperienced angel investment. 
 
Another category of individual investor is the non-angel investor.  These investors would either have a 
direct relationship with the management team of the firm raising capital and would use the FFBA exemption, or they 
would not have a direct relationship with the management team and would use the OM exemptions.  Looking at the 
new FFBA and OM exemptions, Table 8 indicates that the average amount invested using the FFBA exemption 
($27,283) is almost twice as high as the average amount invested using the OM exemption ($13,716).  This provides 
support for Proposition 4, that informal investment is more likely in established informal networks.  In other words, 
an investor is willing to invest a larger amount if they have a prior relationship with the management team of a firm. 
 
As was identified earlier in this study, exempt market investments are highly skewed.  Thus, it may be 
useful to augment our analysis of average amounts invested with information about the distribution of investment 
amounts.  To focus on the key investor groups, only four categories of exemption were studied in detail, see Figure 
3.  The four categories are the new FFBA exemption (3.1(2)), the new OM exemption (4.1(4)), the new AI 
exemption (5.1(2)), and the old SI exemption (122.2(1)). 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Average Amount Invested by Each Type of Purchaser and Exemption Used 
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Average Proceeds per Purchaser
Statutory Exemption
Corporate 
Investor
Fund 
Company 
Investor
Individual 
Investor
Partnership 
Investment
Trust 
Company
Exemption 
Average
Exempt Purchaser 2,000 2,000
Asset Acquisition over $100,000 109,400 109,400
Consideration for Oil/Gas Assets 50,500 12,810 23,579
Sophisticated Investor ($97,000) 275,299 405,349 170,283 306,694 200,000 223,576
Family, Friends, Bus. Assoc. (Old) 28,556 16,013 50,000 16,882
Offering Memorandum - 1st (Old) 25,000 76,250 70,556
Offering Memorandum - Sub. (Old) 2,000 13,111 12,000
Family, Friends, Bus. Assoc. (New) 190,774 50,900 27,283 41,188
Offering Memorandum - (New) 43,800 13,716 16,554
Accredited Investor (New) 128,463 267,809 40,579 291,111 54,167 55,176
CDNX Short Form Offering Document 37,838 19,200 5,643 8,263
Employee, Consultant, Director 25,500 49,457 20,000 47,050
Total 124,858 233,422 28,473 299,422 61,334 41,212  
 
 
Figure 3: Histogram of Proceeds Using Exemptions 3.1(2) [FFBA], 4.1(4) (OM), 5.1(2) (AI), and 122.2(1) (SI) 
 
 
 The histogram indicates that just over 30% of the times the FFBA exemption was used for an amount of 
under $5,000, and just less than 20% of the time the FFBA exemption was used for an amount of between 
$5,000and $10,000.  Thus, half of the time this exemption was used by an individual to invest under $10,000 in a 
firm.  With the OM exemption, almost 45% of the time it was used by individuals to invest under $5,000 in a firm, 
and just over 30% of the time it was used for an investment amount of between $5,000 and $10,000.  For all larger 
investment amounts, the FFBA exemption had a higher percentage usage than the OM exemption.  Again, these 
results are consistent with Proposition 4. 
 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
5,
00
0
10
,0
00
15
,0
00
20
,0
00
25
,0
00
30
,0
00
40
,0
00
50
,0
00
75
,0
00
10
0,
00
0
15
0,
00
0
20
0,
00
0
25
0,
00
0
50
0,
00
0
M
or
e
Proceed Range for Each Purchase
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e 
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
3.1(2)
4.1(4)
5.1(2)
122(1)
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January 2005                                  Volume 4, Number 1 
 35 
The results for these non-angel individual investors are also consistent with the idea that these investors 
making a staged series of investments in developing firms, with the amount of the commitment a function of the 
stage of the firm‟s development and the experience the non-angel has investing with the firm‟s management team.  
Thus, the results are consistent with Proposition 5, that informal investment will make greater use of staged 
investments. 
 
Considering the angel investor market, we note some striking differences between the amounts invested 
using the AI and the SI exemptions.  With a statutory minimum required investment of $97,000 under the SI 
exemption, it is not surprising to note that 30% of the time the exemption was used to invest under $100,000.  Thus, 
about 30% of the time this exemption was used to make the minimum possible investment.  With the new AI 
investment, it is interesting to note that 14% of the time this exemption was used to make an investment of under 
$5,000, 25% of the time it was used to make an investment of under $10,000, and 60% of the time it was used to 
make an investment of under $30,000.  To observe this sort of investing behaviour from angel investors is 
interesting and suggests a number of possible explanations.  One explanation is that angel investors are using the 
ability to invest less than $97,000 in a given firm to increase the number of smaller investments they are making in 
developing firms.  As discussed earlier, this strategy will allow the angel to more easily diversify their private equity 
portfolio and is consistent with Proposition 1.  A second explanation is that angel investors prefer to use a staged 
investment approach when placing money in developing firms.  A staged investment approach is used extensively 
by venture capital investors to allow the VC to “learn” about the organization and its management team before 
committing additional capital.  It is likely that angel investors use a similar staged investment approach whereby 
they will commit a limited amount of capital early in the life of a firm until they gain more information.  As a firm 
successfully develops, the angels will increase their investment amount in later financing rounds.  This explanation 
is consistent with Proposition 2 and with Proposition 5. 
 
 Another previously discussed explanation for the results in Figure 3 is that the changes in regulations 
governing the exempt equity market in Alberta have allowed new inexperienced angel investors to enter this market.  
These inexperienced angels are willing to make a small investment in developing firms until they learn more about 
how to make successful investments in this market.  As these inexperienced angels develop more knowledge and 
confidence with respect to their investment skills in this market, they are expected to increase their level of 
participation and their minimum investment size over time.  This explanation is consistent with Proposition 3. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The exempt market for capital in Alberta is a dynamic market, used extensively by a growing number of 
firms to raise a significant amount of equity capital.  Our study indicates that the market for private equity for 
developing firms in Alberta is much larger than the public equity market for these firms.  Our results also 
demonstrate that there are a number of diverse investors active in this market, including formal and informal 
investors.  Venture capital investors were the major players in the formal market. The informal market includes both 
angel and non-angel investors.  Change in the regulations governing the informal group has had a dramatic effect on 
the investment strategy, with a resulting increase in capital. 
 
Our model and empirical results support the notion that lowering the statutory required investment amount 
by angels allows these investors to become more active in the private equity market and to invest smaller amounts 
per investment.  This result is consistent with the Proposition that angel investors lower their market risk by 
diversifying their investments.  The results also support the Proposition that angel investors prefer to invest a smaller 
amount in a number of firms.  This allows them to better manage risk.  This strategy helps manage agency risk 
because investors can monitor the management team through the stages.  It helps manage emerging market risk 
because the investor can better assess firm‟s prospects before committing to subsequent financing rounds.  We term 
this investment behaviour, “buy and hope”.  Finally, the results also support the Proposition that lowering the 
minimum investment encourages less experienced angel investors to enter the marketplace.  As these neophyte angel 
investors become more experienced with the private equity market there are expected to be willing to invest larger 
amounts in additional firms in the future. 
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The study also documented the existence of a very large informal market for equity capital, the family, 
friends and business associates (FFBA) of the firm founders, and the non-angel investing public (the OM investors).  
These investors provided 35% of the capital in the private equity market but have historically not been carefully 
studied.  The results of this study support the Proposition that these non-angel informal investors prefer to invest in 
established informal networks, i.e. they prefer to invest with people they know.  As well, the Proposition that these 
non-angel informal investors prefer to use a staged investment approach was also supported. 
 
Areas for Future Research 
 
 This study provides a preliminary examination of the nature of the private equity market based on 
secondary market data.  While there are a number of interesting findings with respect to this market, there remain a 
number of unanswered questions.  The study found that a change in security market regulations resulted in a change 
in the investment behaviour of angel investors; however, we were unable to clearly determine whether the change 
was due to these angels seeking to diversify away market risk in their portfolio, or due to their desire to engage in a 
staged investment strategy.  Further detailed analysis of the investment patterns that angel investors make with 
respect to a particular firm over time may help shed light on this issue.  Specifically, it may be possible to gather 
information about the stages of financing used by private equity firms and to track the investment decisions made by 
angels with respect to these stages.  This time series analysis of firm financings may help confirm that angels follow 
a “buy and hope” strategy with respect to their investment in private firms. 
 
 An alternative method of gaining insights into the decision process followed by angel investors would be to 
conduct interviews of this investment group.  While there is a great deal of historic research with respect to the 
personal characteristics of angel investors, and some research with respect to their investment screening process, 
further investigation of their investment decision making process over time is warranted. 
 
 Finally, while the results indicate that a change in security market regulations resulted in an increase in the 
pool of capital available from informal equity investors, we were unable to clearly determine the reason for this 
increase.  Were existing angels more willing to provide capital once the regulations were amended, or did new 
inexperienced angels enter the market?  Clearly the later event would be of greater long-term impact to the supply of 
informal capital in the Alberta marketplace.  A series of interviews with private equity market participants may help 
to resolve this issue. 
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